Announcements to Attentive Agents by Bolander, Thomas et al.
  
 
To link to this article : DOI : 10.1007/s10849-015-9234-3 
URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-015-9234-3 
To cite this version : Bolander, Thomas and van Ditmarsch, Hans and 
Herzig, Andreas and Lorini, Emiliano and Pardo, Pere and 
Schwarzentruber, François Announcements to Attentive Agents. (2015) 
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, vol. 25 (n° 1). pp. 1-35. 
ISSN 0925-8531 
Open Archive TOULOUSE Archive Ouverte (OATAO)  
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and 
makes it freely available over the web where possible.  
This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ 
Eprints ID : 16889 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the repository 
administrator: staff-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
Announcements to Attentive Agents
Thomas Bolander1 · Hans van Ditmarsch2 ·
Andreas Herzig3 · Emiliano Lorini3,4 ·
Pere Pardo2 · François Schwarzentruber5
Abstract In public announcement logic it is assumed that all agents pay attention to
the announcement. Weaker observational conditions can be modelled in action model
logic. In this work, we propose a version of public announcement logic wherein it
is encoded in the states of the epistemic model which agents pay attention to the
announcement. This logic is called attention-based announcement logic. We give an
axiomatization of the logic and prove that complexity of satisfiability is the same
as that of public announcement logic, and therefore lower than that of action model
logic. An attention-based announcement can also be described as an action model. We
extend our logic by integrating attention change. Finally, we add the notion of common
belief to the language, we exploit this to formalize the concept of joint attention, that
has been widely discussed in the philosophical and cognitive science literature, and
we provide a corresponding axiomatization. This axiomatization also employs the
auxiliary notion of attention-based relativized common belief.
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1 Introduction
In public announcement logic (Plaza 1989) it is assumed that announcements are
observed by all agents: it models the consequences of each of the agents incorpo-
rating a new formula into its set of beliefs. It does not model why the agent should
wish to incorporate that new information. These epistemic actions are called public
announcements, as they have the legal connotation that the agents cannot from then
on be excused not to have heard what was said. Once the government has announced a
new election, they cannot be held liable when you forget to vote on election day. You
were supposed to know.
In this work we take one step back from that point of view. When an announcement
is made, it may well be that some agents were not paying attention and therefore did
not hear it. Also, there may be uncertainty among the agents about who is paying
attention and who not, and therefore, who heard the message and who not. In our
work we model restricted attention and uncertainty about it.
Additional to the usual set of propositional variables we add designated variables
for each agent, that express that the agent is paying attention. A given state of a Kripke
model therefore contains information about which agents are paying attention and
which agents are not paying attention. This determines the meaning of what we call
attention-based announcements. A special case is that of introspective agents that
know whether they are paying attention.
An announcement by an outsider (an agent who is not explicitly modelled in the
logical system) that is public for a subset of all agents is modelled in Gerbrandy
(1999), Baltag et al. (1998), French et al. (2014) as a private announcement to that
subset of agents. The agents’ attention configuration behind such announcements can
be modelled in our logic by a particular formula built from our attention variables.
However, our logic generalizes (Gerbrandy 1999), because the ‘attention level’ of a
given agent can vary between the states. Our logic can also be seen as a fragment of
action model logic (Baltag et al. 1998).
We show by way of a tableau calculus that the complexity of satisfiability in our
logic remains in the same range as that of public announcement logic, viz. PSPACE
(Lutz 2006). This contrasts with the higher complexity of action model logic, that is
NEXPTIME (Aucher and Schwarzentruber 2013). As the action models corresponding
to attention-based announcements can be quite large, we consider that this is indeed a
valuable result.
We also add further dynamics to our logic, namely change of attention. This is an
elementary further addition to the logical framework and this logic also has a com-
plete axiomatization. With this addition we can embed Gerbrandy’s believed public
announcement logic into attention-based announcement logic.
In attention-based announcement logic we can formalize a concept that has been
widely discussed in the philosophical and in the cognitive science literature, namely
joint attention (Tommasello 1995; Lorini et al. 2005; Clark and Marshall 1981). This
concept has been shown to be crucial for explaining the genesis of common belief in a
group of agents. This then sets the stage for the final part of our work, wherein we add
common belief and attentive relativized common belief to the logical language, and we
axiomatize the resulting logic employing the techniques of van Benthem et al. (2006).
Example 1 Before we jump into the definitions, let us give a motivating example.
Consider two agents Anne and Bob who are both uncertain of dinner being served
soon (enough…). Now Carol says that dinner will be at 11 at night (we are in Seville,
people tend to eat rather late there). Let us ignore what Carol may learn from her
announcement, in other words: we do not model her knowledge or belief. If neither
Anne nor Bob are paying attention, they won’t gain any information at all. If Anne is
paying attention but not Bob, Anne now knows that dinner is at 11 but Bob doesn’t.
Does Anne know that? If Anne is uncertain whether Bob was paying attention, she
cannot conclude that Bob is still uncertain about the dinner time. Let us restart the
scenario. Now, prior to her announcement, Carol claps her hands. Anne and Bob are
startled. They are paying attention. Now Carol says: dinner will be at 11! They now
have common knowledge of the dinner time. Next restart of the scenario: instead of
clapping her hands, she taps Anne on her shoulder and then says: dinner will be at 11
(and Bob does not notice that), and then taps Bob on his shoulder and does likewise.
However, as Anne was already attentive, she obviously notices that Carol informs
Bob. Now, Anne and Bob both know that dinner is at 11. But they have no common
knowledge of that. More complex scenarios are conceivable, and, given that things
may happen that you do not notice, we are rather modelling Anne’s and Bob’s beliefs
than their knowledge. An important modelling contribution in our work is that under
certain conditions common belief can still be obtained even when Anne and Bob are
not both paying attention and common belief was so far not established.
Section 2 presents the language, structures, and semantics of attention-based
announcement logic. Section 3 provides the axiomatization. Section 4 establishes the
PSPACE complexity of satisfiability. Section 5 gives an embedding into action model
logic. Section 6 adds operators for attention change to the attention-based announce-
ment logic. Section 7 addresses joint attention, and, finally, Sect. 8 introduces different
notions for common belief and provides a complete axiomatization for that addition.
2 Attention-Based Announcement Logic ABAL
Let AGT be a finite set of agents, let ATM be a countable set of propositional variables,
and let H = {ha | a ∈ AGT} be a set of propositional variables that is disjoint from
ATM. A proposition ha (for ‘a is hearing what is being said’ or ‘a is listening’)
expresses that agent a is paying attention and so will hear announcements.
Definition 2 (Language) The language L of Attention-Based Announcement Logic
(ABAL) is defined as follows, where p ∈ ATM and a ∈ AGT (so that, implicitly,
ha ∈ H).
L ∋ ϕ : := p | ha | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
For A ⊆ AGT, we abbreviate
∧
a∈A ha by h A. Let L
− be the language L (of multi-
agent modal logic) without the inductive construct for announcement.
We write q to denote a variable that is either a p ∈ ATM or a ha ∈ H. If we wish
to be explicit about the sets of agents and propositional variables we write L(ATM ∪
H, AGT) instead of L. Other propositional connectives (including ⊥ and ⊤), and the
dual modalities, are defined as usual. Formula Baϕ is read as ‘agent a believes that ϕ
is true’, and formula [ϕ]ψ as ‘after the public announcement of ϕ, ψ holds’. We write
ψ[ϕ/p] for uniform substitution of ϕ for p in ψ .
Definition 3 (Epistemic attention model) An epistemic attention model is a triple
M = (S, R, V ) with S a non-empty set of states, R a function assigning to each agent
an accessibility relation Ra ⊆ S× S and V a function assigning to each propositional
variable q ∈ ATM ∪ H the subset V (q) ⊆ S where the variable is true.
Definition 4 (Attention introspection) Given an epistemic attention model M =
(S, R, V ), the model satisfies the property of attention introspection if for all s, t ∈ S,
if (s, t) ∈ Ra , then s ∈ V (ha) iff t ∈ V (ha).
We will see that, when attention introspection holds, an agent knows whether she is
paying attention. In this paper we focus on two classes of models: Kn , where n =
|AGT|, that is, multiple agents and no special properties of the accessibility relations,
and K45hn , that is, multiple agents with transitive and Euclidean accessibility relations,
and with attention introspection as well. We emphasize that attention introspection is
a model property (it depends on the valuation of the propositional variables in H) and
not a frame property, so that K45hn is indeed a model class and not a frame class.
Definition 5 (Semantics) Let M = (S, R, V ) be an epistemic attention model and s ∈
S. We define the semantics by induction on ϕ ∈ L. (To disambiguate we occasionally
put parentheses around M, s.)
M, s |	 q iff s ∈ V (q) for q ∈ ATM ∪ H
M, s |	 ¬ϕ iff M, s  ϕ
M, s |	 ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |	 ϕ and M, s |	 ψ
M, s |	 Baϕ iff M, t |	 ϕ for all (s, t) ∈ Ra
M, s |	 [ϕ]ψ iff Mϕ, (s, h) |	 ψ
where Mϕ = (S
′, R′, V ′) is defined as follows.
• S′ = S × {h, h} (where h denotes ‘heard’ copy of the model and h ‘not heard’);
• for each agent a, ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a if and only if (s, t) ∈ Ra and:
1. i = h, j = h, (M, s) |	 ha and (M, t) |	 ϕ, or
2. i = h, j = h, and (M, s)  ha , or
3. i = h, j = h;
• for each p ∈ ATM, (s, h) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p) and (s, h) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p).
Validity is defined as usual, as truth in all states in all models. The set of valid L-
formulas on the class of models Kn is called ABAL, and the set of valid L formulas
on the class of models K45hn is called ABAL
int.
The truth condition for attention-based announcements [ϕ] is different from that
of state eliminating public announcement (Plaza 1989) and also different from that of
arrow eliminating public announcement (Gerbrandy 1999), although it comes closer
to the latter in spirit: it is also arrow eliminating. We recall the semantics of arrow
eliminating (‘believed’) public announcements, for which we write ϕ: M, s |	 ϕψ
iff M |ϕ, s |	 ψ where M |ϕ = (S, R′′, V ) is such that for each agent a, (s, t) ∈ R′′a
iff M, t |	 ϕ. It is well-known that state eliminating public announcement and arrow
eliminating public announcement have the same update effect (they result in bisimilar
models) on the part of the model where the announced formula is true (Kooi 2007).
Attention-based public announcements have the semantics of arrow eliminating
public announcement for the agents that are paying attention, but not for the agents
that are not paying attention. After the announcement of ϕ, the agents that are attentive
only consider possible the h-copies of the states of the original model M in which ϕ is
true. In contrast, the agents that are not attentive only consider possible h-copies of the
states of the original model M . This construction of the updated model Mϕ ensures that
attentive agents learn ϕ while inattentive agents do not learn anything, they think that
nothing at all happened. In that sense, the semantics is not unlike that of the Gerbrandy-
style private announcement to a subgroup (Gerbrandy 1999). This is a special case of
the already mentioned arrow eliminating public announcement. An important differ-
ence with Gerbrandy is that in private announcements the informed agents know that
the other agents did not notice anything at all, whereas in attention-based announce-
ments the attentive agents may be uncertain about who is paying attention. Dually,
the announcer of private announcements only adresses that subgroup, whereas an
attention-based announcement is addressed to all agents. It merely may not reach
all agents. A more precise relation between private announcement and attention-
based announcements can be given after we also introduce attention change, in
Sect. 6.
The agents who are not attentive may have incorrect beliefs after an attention-
based announcement, even if they only had correct beliefs before. This is obvious, for
example, after an announcement of p to a and b it may be that a now believes p but that
b, who was not paying attention, still believes that a does not believe p. The class S5hn
(where all accessibility relations are equivalence relations) is therefore not preserved
after attention-based announcements (nor is any other model class contained in T , the
reflexive models). Also, as usual for public announcements to agents having possibly
incorrect beliefs, the class KD45hn (i.e., K45
h
n plus D for seriality of accessibility
relations) is not preserved: an agent who believes p, will have the empty accessibility
relation after incorporating the information that p is false. Seriality (D) may therefore
not be preserved after an announcement. This explains the restriction of our results to
the classes Kn and K45
h
n .
Proposition 6 When attention introspection holds, an agent knows whether she is
paying attention: Baha ∨ Ba¬ha is valid in ABAL.
Proof Both ha → Baha and ¬ha → Ba¬ha are valid. ⊓⊔
Our definition of attention introspection matches that of awareness introspection in
the economics literature Heifetz et al. (2006). Just as it is counterintuitive that an
agent is aware (of worlds, of formulas, …) but believes that she is not aware, it is
counterintuitive that an agent is attentive (of possibly incoming new information)
but believes that she is not attentive. It seems less counterintuitive that an agent is
unattentive but believes that she is attentive.
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Fig. 1 Example 8 illustrates an attention-based announcement. The left grey square is the h part of the
model M , the consequences of b paying attention. The right grey square is the h part of the model M , the
(absence of) consequences of a not paying attention
Proposition 7 (Preservation of attention introspection) If M satisfies attention intro-
spection then Mϕ satisfies attention introspection.
Proof Obvious. ⊓⊔
We finish this section with an example illustrating the semantics.
Example 8 Ann (a) and Bill (b) have lunch in Excelsior and they both ruminate about
snowfall this afternoon (p)—a regular occurrence in Nancy, many times of the year.
In fact Bill has seen the weather report and knows whether it will snow, while Ann
does not. However, Bill never knows whether Ann is attentive, whereas Ann knows
that Bill is attentive—let us not delve into the reasons for this credulous but justified
stance. This situation is depicted as model M in Fig. 1. Note that both agents know
whether they are attentive: we have attention introspection. Cath comes along and
says she just read the weather report: it will snow. Cath’s announcement is modelled
as an announcement of p by an outsider. This results in the model transition depicted
in Fig. 1. Any of the four leftmost points in Mp can be the actual state. For example,
if Ann and Bill pay attention and p is true (the bottom-left state in M) then after the
announcement of p (the bottom-left state in Mp) Bill remains uncertain if Ann now
knows that p, as he considers it possible that she was not paying attention (top-left
state), in which case she would have remained uncertain about p (the two a-arrows
pointing to the right part of Mp, that copies the original model M).
Table 1 The axiomatizations for ABAL (minus the (*) and (**) axioms) and ABALint (all)
All propositional tautologies Baϕ→ Ba Baϕ (∗)
Ba(ϕ→ ψ) → (Baϕ→ Baψ) ¬Baϕ→ Ba¬Baϕ (∗)
[ϕ]q ↔ q ha → Baha (∗∗)
[ϕ]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ]ψ ¬ha → Ba¬ha (∗∗)
[ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) From ϕ infer Baϕ
[ϕ]Baψ ↔ ((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)) ∧ (¬ha → Baψ)) From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
From ϕ ↔ ψ infer χ [ϕ/p] ↔ χ [ψ/p]
3 Axiomatization
Definition 9 The axiomatization of ABAL consists of all the derivation rules and the
non-*-ed axioms of Table 1. The axiomatization of ABALint consists of ABAL plus
the *-ed axioms.
The crucial axiom in the axiomatization is that for belief after attention-based
announcement:
[ϕ]Baψ ↔ ((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ)) ∧ (¬ha → Baψ))
It says that the belief consequences of an attention-based announcement are either,
if the agent pays attention, what the agent believes to be the consequences of the
announcement in case it is true, or else, if the agent does not pay attention, what the
belief consequences were before the announcement. In other words, for the latter, an
agent not hearing the announcement does not change her beliefs.
The axioms * formalize that agents have introspective beliefs. They are not uncer-
tain about what they believe. But their beliefs may still be incorrect. The axioms **
formalize attention introspection. The agents know whether they are paying attention.
The axiomatization follows the pattern of arrow eliminating (‘believed’) public
announcements, not that of state eliminating (‘true’) public announcements. Believed
public announcements ofϕ have precondition⊤, not preconditionϕ. Therefore, there is
no relativization to ϕ in the axioms. For example, we have axioms [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ]ψ
and [ϕ]p ↔ p instead of [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ → ¬[ϕ]ψ) and [ϕ]p ↔ (ϕ → p). The
reduction axiom for belief after attention-based announcement is reminiscent of that
of belief after arrow eliminating public announcement: [ϕ]Baψ ↔ Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ).
Theorem 10 The axiomatization of ABAL is sound and complete for the class of Kn
models, and is equally expressive as the base modal logic Kn .
Proof Soundness
We only show the validity of [ϕ]Baψ ↔ ((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ))∧(¬ha → Baψ)).
Let a pointed epistemic attention model (M, s) be given.
⇒
First assume M, s |	 ha , and let (s, t) ∈ Ra such that M, t |	 ϕ. In that case,
(t, h) ∈ Mϕ . Now using the assumption M, s |	 [ϕ]Baψ , it follows that Mϕ, (s, h) |	
Baψ , and with ((s, h), (t, h)) ∈ R
ϕ
a (because (s, t) ∈ Ra , M, s |	 ha , and M, t |	 ϕ,
as spelled out in Definition 5) we obtain the required Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ .
Now assume M, s |	 ¬ha , and let (s, t) ∈ Ra . Then ((s, h), (t, h)) ∈ R
ϕ
a , and with
M, s |	 [ϕ]Baψ again we get Mϕ, (s, h) |	 Baψ , and therefore Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ . One
then uses that Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ iff M, t |	 ψ (which is easily obtained).
⇐
The other direction proceeds fairly similarly.
3.1 Completeness and expressivity
The standard reduction argument applies: all axioms for the consequences of
announcements push the announcement operator deeper into the formula on the right
hand side, until one finally arrives at an announcement before a propositional vari-
able, [ϕ]q, which is equivalent to q (where q ∈ ATM ∪ H). Therefore the logic is as
expressive as the base modal logic—that is complete. ⊓⊔
Theorem 11 The axiomatization ABALint is sound and complete for the class K45hn .
Proof The usual introspection axioms Baϕ → Ba Baϕ and ¬Baϕ → Ba¬Baϕ are
valid on K45hn , and correspond to frame properties. The axioms ha → Baha and
¬ha → Ba¬ha are also valid on the class K45
h
n . They do not correspond to frame
properties (as they depend on the valuation of propositional variables ha), but they
enforce in the canonical model (for the base model logic) a requirement that maximal
consistent sets always contain both ha and Baha , or ¬ha and Ba¬ha . ⊓⊔
Soundness and completeness of the logics also follow indirectly from the action model
modelling of attention-based announcements in Sect. 5.
We observe that [ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ is not an axiom. It is well-known that, in
order to demonstrate completeness of an axiomatization in dynamic epistemic logic
by way of reduction axioms, one either needs the derivation rule of substitution of
equivalents (From ϕ ↔ ψ infer χ [ϕ/p] ↔ χ [ψ/p]), or one needs an axiom on the
composition of dynamic modalities (as above, for attentive announcements); see Wang
and Cao (2013) for an in-depth discussion.
As we frequently use this composition property of attentive announcements, for
example, in the tableaux construction and in the common belief section, it may be
useful to point out why it is valid.
Proposition 12 |	 [ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ
Proof Let (M, s) be a pointed epistemic attention model, and ϕ,ψ,χ ∈ L. We
wish to show that M, s |	 [ϕ][ψ]χ iff M, s |	 [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ . Using the seman-
tics of attention-based announcement, this is equivalent to (Mϕ)ψ , ((s, h), h) |	 χ iff
Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , (s, h) |	 χ . We now observe that ((Mϕ)ψ , ((s, h), h))↔(Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , (s, h))
by way of the bisimulation R defined as (using infix notation): for all s ∈ S,
((s, h), h))R(s, h) and ((s, h), h))R(s, h). Note that (i) the domain of (Mϕ)ψ is twice
the size of the domain of Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , and that (i i) we do not define the bisimulation
on all elements of the domain of (Mϕ)ψ , namely not on those of shape ((s, h), h)
or shape ((s, h), h). We only wish to demonstrate bisimilarity of the pointed models
((Mϕ)ψ , ((s, h), h)) and (Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , (s, h)), and from points ((s, h), h) only those of
shape ((t, h), h) and shape ((t, h), h) are accessible (namely, the first for attentive
agents, and the second for non-attentive agents). (So, notwithstanding the domains
of different size, the bisimulation R is a bijection from the part of the domain of
(Mϕ)ψ on which it is defined, to the domain of Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ .) Then, having established
bisimilarity, we use that bisimilarity implies logical equivalence for attention-based
announcement logic (which can be proved either by induction on the structure of for-
mulas, with non-trivial case [χ1]χ2, or by referring to the action model embedding in
Sect. 5). From the logical equivalence of (Mϕ)ψ , ((s, h), h) and Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , (s, h) then
follows, as required, that (Mϕ)ψ , ((s, h), h) |	 χ iff Mϕ∧[ϕ]ψ , (s, h) |	 χ . ⊓⊔
4 Satisfiability
We now focus on the ABAL satisfiability problem on the class of all Kn frames. The
satisfiability problem of a formula in action model logic plus the union operator over
actions is NEXPTIME-complete (Aucher and Schwarzentruber 2013). In Sect. 5 we
will see that the logic ABAL is a fragment of action model logic. So the satisfiabil-
ity problem of ABAL is decidable. In this section we will show that, however, its
complexity remains that of public announcement logic: PSPACE.
It is difficult to turn the tableau method of Aucher and Schwarzentruber (2013) into
a PSPACE procedure, because each node in the tableau may contain an exponential
amount of information in the length of the input formula. This is because the action
model corresponding to an attention-based announcement is exponential in the size
of the number of agents (see the next Sect. 5). Surprisingly, we can adapt the tableau
method of Aucher and Schwarzentruber (2013) (for action model logic) so that the
amount of information in a node is polynomial in the size of the input. We now proceed
by first defining the usual tableau terminology, and then prove PSPACE-completeness
of ABAL in Proposition 15.
Let Lab be a countable set of labels designed to represent states of the epistemic
attention model (M, s). Our tableau method manipulates terms that we call tableau
terms. They are of the following kind:
• (σ  ϕ) where σ ∈ Lab is a symbol (that represents a state in the initial model),
 is a sequence of formulas (where [] denotes the empty list, and where : :ϕ
denotes concatenation of list  with formula ϕ), and ϕ ∈ L. This means that ϕ is
true after the announcement of the formulas of the sequence  (in that order) in
the state denoted by σ ;
• (σ  ) means that in σ all the announcements in the sequence  are true when
they are sequentially announced; e.g. (σ [ϕ1,ϕ2] ) means that ϕ1 ∧ [ϕ1]ϕ2 is
true in σ ;
• (σ  ×) means that in σ some announcement in the sequence  is not true when
announced; e.g. (σ [ϕ1,ϕ2] ×) means that ϕ1 ∧ [ϕ1]ϕ2 is false in σ ;
• (σ Raσ1) means that the state denoted by σ is linked by Ra to the state denoted by
σ1;
• ⊥ denotes an inconsistency.
A tableau rule is represented by a numerator N above a line and a finite list of
denominators D1, . . . ,Dk below this line, separated by vertical bars:
N
D1| . . . |Dk
The numerator and the denominators are finite sets of tableau terms.
A tableau tree is a finite tree with a set of tableau terms at each node. A rule with
numerator N is applicable to a node carrying a set Ŵ, if Ŵ contains an instance of N .
If no rule is applicable, Ŵ is said to be saturated. We call a node σ an end node, if the
set of formulas Ŵ it carries is saturated or if ⊥ ∈ Ŵ. The tableau tree is extended as
follows:
1. Choose a leaf node n carrying Ŵ where n is not an end node, and choose a rule ρ
applicable to n.
2. (a) If ρ has only one denominator, add the appropriate instantiation to Ŵ.
(b) If ρ has k denominators with k>1, create k successor nodes for n, where
each successor i carries the union of Ŵ with an appropriate instantiation of
denominator Di .
A branch in a tableau tree is a path from the root to an end node. A branch is
closed if its end node contains ⊥, otherwise it is open. A tableau tree is closed if all
its branches are closed, otherwise it is open. The tableau tree for a formula ϕ ∈ L is
the tableau tree obtained from the root {(σ0 [] ϕ)} when all leaves are end nodes.
The tableau rules are depicted in Fig. 2. They contain the classical propositional
rules (∧), (¬¬) and a rule (¬∧) with two denominators that handles disjunctions. The
rules (←q) and (←¬q) (for q ∈ ATM ∪ H ) express that valuations are not changed
by announcements.
Depending on the value of ha , there are two versions of the rules Ba and ¬Ba . Let
us explain the rule (¬Bha ), for when agent a is attentive: if after the announcements
in  the formula ¬Baϕ is true in σ , then agent a can reach from σ a possible state
denoted σnew, such that all the announcements in  are true when announced, and
such that afterwards ¬ϕ holds. On the contrary, in the rule (¬Bha ), agent a does not
consider announcements in σnew. This is why we impose ¬ϕ to be true in σnew after
absence of announcement.
The rule (hear) is a cut-rule for the atomic propositions ha in the root. It is required
to guarantee the application of rules (Ba) and (¬Ba). The rule (hear) is non-analytic:
the formulas in its denominator are not subformulas of the input formula.
The rules (), (×), (clash,×) and ([]×) deal with the truth of the sequence .
Example 13 Figure 3 shows a tableau for formula [p]Baq ∧ ¬(¬(ha ∧ ¬Ba(¬(p ∧
¬q))) ∧ ¬(¬ha ∧ ¬Baq)). As all branches are closed, we conclude that the formula
is unsatisfiable.
Theorem 14 (Soundness and completeness of the tableau method) A L-formula ϕ is
satisfiable iff there exists a tableau for ϕ with an open branch.
Announcements to Attentive Agents
(σ Σ ϕ ∧ ψ)
(σ Σ ϕ)
(σ Σ ψ)
(∧) (σ Σ ¬¬ϕ)
(σ Σ ϕ)
(¬¬)
(σ Σ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(σ Σ ¬ϕ) | (σ Σ ¬ψ)
(¬∧)
(σ Σ q)(σ Σ ¬q)
⊥
(⊥)
(σ Σ [ϕ]ψ)
(σ Σ::ϕ ψ)
([ϕ])
(σ Σ ¬[ϕ]ψ)
(σ Σ::ϕ ¬ψ)
(¬[ϕ])
(σ Σ q)
(σ [] q)
(←q)
(σ Σ ¬q)
(σ [] ¬q)
(←¬q)
(σ Σ::ϕ )
(σ Σ ϕ)
(σ Σ )
()
(σ Σ::ϕ ×)
(σ Σ )
(σ Σ ¬ϕ)
(σ Σ ×)
(×)
(σ Σ ×)(σ Σ )
⊥
(clash,×)
(σ [] ×)
⊥
([]×)
(σ Σ Baϕ)(σ [] ha)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 Σ )
(σ1 Σ ϕ)
(σ1 Σ ×)
(Bha )
(σ Σ Baϕ)(σ [] ¬ha)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 [] ϕ)
(Bha )
(σ [] ha)(σ Σ ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew Σ )
(σnew Σ ¬ϕ)
(¬Bha ) (σ [] ¬ha)(σ Σ ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew [] ¬ϕ)
(¬Bha )
(σ [] ha) (σ [] ¬ha)
(hear)
Fig. 2 Tableau rules for ABAL
Proof ⇒
Suppose that formula ϕ is satisfiable. Then there exists a pointed model (M, s)
where M = (S, R, V ) such that M, s |	 ϕ. We use the model M and the updated
models from M to construct an open branch in the tableau tree for ϕ. In the fol-
lowing, we index a model M with a list of announced formulas  as follows: we
inductively define M by M[] = M and M::ψ = (M)ψ . We also write (s, h) for
(. . . (s, h), . . . h).
Now we construct step by step a branch and in parallel we construct a (partial)
mapping f : Lab → S such that, if Ŵ is the set of tableau terms carried by the last
node in the already constructed branch, then:
• for all labels σ appearing in Ŵ, f (σ ) is defined;
• if (σ  ϕ) ∈ Ŵ then M, ( f (σ ), h) |	 ϕ;
• if (σ  ) ∈ Ŵ then if  = [ψ1, . . . ,ψn], we have M, f (σ ) |	 ψ1,
Mψ1 , ( f (σ ), h) |	 ψ2, . . . , M[ψ1,...,ψn−1], ( f (σ ),
h) |	 ψn ;
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(σ [] [p]Baq ∧ ¬(¬(ha ∧ ¬Ba(¬(p ∧ ¬q))) ∧ ¬(¬ha ∧ ¬Baq)))
(σ [] [p]Baq)
(σ [] ¬(¬(ha ∧ ¬Ba(¬(p ∧ ¬q))) ∧ ¬(¬ha ∧ ¬Baq)))
(∧)
(σ [p] Baq)
([ϕ])
(σ [] ¬¬(ha ∧ ¬Ba(¬(p ∧ ¬q))))
(¬∧)
(σ [] (ha ∧ ¬Ba(¬(p ∧ ¬q))))
(¬¬)
(σ [] ha)
(σ [] ¬Ba(¬(p ∧ ¬q)))
(∧)
(σRaσ1)
(σ1 [] )
(σ1 [] ¬¬(p ∧ ¬q))
(¬Bha )
(σ1 [] (p ∧ ¬q))
(¬¬)
(σ1 [] p)
(σ1 [] ¬q)
(∧)
(σ1 [p] ×)
(Bha )
(σ1 [] )
(σ1 [] ¬p)
(×)
⊥
(⊥)
(σ1 [] ×)
(×)
⊥
([]×)
(σ1 [p] )
(σ1 [p] q)
(Bha )
(σ1 [] q)
(←q)
⊥
(⊥)
(σ [] ¬¬(¬ha ∧ ¬Baq))
(¬∧)
(σ [] (¬ha ∧ ¬Baq))
(¬¬)
(σ [] ¬ha)
(σ [] ¬Baq)
(∧)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 [] ¬q)
(¬Bh¯a )
(σ1 [] q)
(Bh¯a )
⊥
(⊥)
Fig. 3 Example of a tableau tree
• if (σ  ×) ∈ Ŵ then if  = [ψ1, . . . ,ψn], we have that either M, f (σ )  ψ1 or
Mψ1 , ( f (σ ), h)  ψ2, . . . , or M[ψ1,...,ψn−1], ( f (σ ),
h)  ψn ;
• if (σ Ra σ1) ∈ Ŵ then ( f (σ ), f (σ1)) ∈ Ra .
We start the construction with the root of the tableau tree carryingŴ0 = {(σ0 [] ϕ)}
and f (σ0) = s and for all σ = σ0, f (σ ) is undefined.
We then assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) an already constructed branch and
mapping f with the above properties, and demonstrate how this branch can be extended
and this f can be expanded, for the example of the tableau rule (¬Bha ). We recall the
rule:
(σ [] ha)(σ  ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew  )
(σnew  ¬ϕ)
(¬Bha )
Let Ŵ be the set of tableau terms that we reach with the already constructed branch. In
order to apply rule (¬Bha ) we may suppose (IH) that (σ [] ha), (σ  ¬Baϕ) ∈ Ŵ and
that f (σ ) is defined such that M, f (σ ) |	 ha and M, ( f (σ ), h) |	 ¬Baϕ. According
to the truth conditions, this means that there exists an a-successor of ( f (σ ), h) in M
satisfying ¬ϕ. As ( f (σ ), h) |	 ha , this successor is of the form (t, h). We define
f (σnew) = t and we extend Ŵ to
Ŵ ∪ {(σ Ra σnew), (σnew  ), (σnew  ¬ϕ)}.
The proof is similar for other tableaux rules.
Observe that in this process of branch extension we can never match the numerator
of a rule that has an inconsistency in its denominator. For instance, take the rule (⊥)
and suppose that wish to extend a branch with (σ  q), (σ  ¬q) ∈ Ŵ. By induction
we already have that M, f (σ ) |	 q and M, f (σ ) |	 ¬q, which is in contradiction
to our inductive assumption of satisfiability.
We conclude that there exists a tableau for ϕ with an open branch.
⇐
Given an open branch, we construct a model M where states are the nodes σ ,
relations are inferred from terms of the form (σ Ra σ1), and valuations are inferred
from terms of the form (σ [] p) and (σ [] ¬p). We then prove by induction over the
complexity of  and ψ that, if (σ  ) appears on the branch, then (σ  ψ) is in
the branch iff M, (σ, h) |	 ψ .
For instance, suppose (σ  ¬Baϕ) and (σ [] ha) appear in the branch. Then
rule (¬Bha ) has been applied. Therefore, we find terms (σ Ra σnew), (σnew  ),
(σnew  ¬ϕ) on the branch. By induction hypothesis, M, (σnew, h) is well-defined
and M, (σnew, h) |	 ¬ϕ. By the construction of M , (σ, σnew) ∈ Ra , so that
M, (σ, h) |	 ¬Baϕ.
We conclude that, when (σ [] ϕ) appears on the branch, then M, σ |	 ϕ, i.e., ϕ is
satisfiable. ⊓⊔
Proposition 15 Satisfiability of L formulas in the class of Kn models is PSPACE-
complete.
Proof As explained in Halpern and Moses (1992), a tableau method leads to a pro-
cedure using a polynomial amount of space in the input formula length, if we can
apply the rules by only keeping in memory the content of a branch. In our case the
argument is essentially the same (see also Balbiani et al. (2010)): we only keep in
memory the information concerning the current node and its path to the root node, in
order to be able to backtrack. We moreover restrict the applicability of the (hear) rule
to the atomic propositions ha for which a occurs in the input formula. The satisfiabil-
ity problem is PSPACE-hard, because we can reduce polynomially the satisfiability
problem for Kn (the multi-agent version of the minimal modal logic K). ⊓⊔
We leave open the complexity of satisfiability of the logic ABALint, that is interpreted
on the class of K45hn models. As the complexity of satisfiability of the underlying
epistemic logic K45n (for n ≥ 2) is PSPACE-complete, we conjecture that the com-
plexity of ABALint is also PSPACE-complete. Proving this seemed a highly technical
exercise of limited additional value to our current undertaking.
This ends the core presentation of the logic ABAL. In the remainder of the paper
we model attention-based announcements as an action model (Sect. 5), we model
attention change (Sect. 6), and the concept of joint attention and the related issue of
common belief (Sect. 7 and Sect. 8).
5 Action Model for Attention-Based Announcement
Every attention-based announcement is definable as an action model. Whether an
announcement ϕ is heard in a given state, depends on the value of ha for every agent
a in that state. The agents who hear the announcement retain all arrows pointing to
states where ϕ holds and delete all arrows pointing to states where ϕ does not hold,
and that is independent of the truth of ϕ in the actual state; whereas the agents who
do not hear the announcement think that nothing has happened, i.e., also independent
of the truth of ϕ they think that the trivial action with precondition ⊤ happened. We
can define such an action model economically, in the sense of producing a resulting
model with a minimal duplication of states into bisimilar states. Still, it is a fairly big
model, exponential in the number of agents. For those unfamiliar with action models
we have put the relevant technical machinery in the Appendix.
In Definition 20 we give a translation from attention-based announcement logic
ABAL into the action model logic of Baltag et al. (1998). Definition 19 spells out
the inductive clause for attention-based announcement of that translation, wherein the
action model for attention-based announcement is constructed. Prior to that, we first
define the relevant technical machinery for action models.
An action model is a structure like an epistemic model but with a precondition
function instead of a valuation function. We recall (def. 2) that L− is the language L
without the inductive construct for announcement.
Definition 16 (Action model) An action model M = (S, R, pre) consists of a domain
S of actions, an accessibility function R : AGT → P(S × S), where each Ra is an
accessibility relation, and a precondition function pre : S → L−. A pointed (and
possibly multi-pointed) action model (M, s), where s ∈ S, is an epistemic action.
Performing an epistemic action in an epistemic state means computing what is known
as their restricted modal product. This product models the new state of information.
Definition 17 (Update of an epistemic attention model with an action model) Given
epistemic attention model M = (S, R, V ) and action model M = (S, R, pre), their
update (product) M ⊗M is the epistemic attention model M ⊗M = (S′, R′, V ′) such
that
S′ = {(t, t) | M, t |	 pre(t)}
((t, t), (t ′, t′)) ∈ R′a iff (t, t
′) ∈ Ra and (t, t
′) ∈ Ra
(t, t) ∈ V ′(q) iff t ∈ V (q) for all q ∈ ATM ∪ H
If s ∈ S, s ∈ S, and M, s |	 pre(s), then (M ⊗ M, (s, s)) is the update of pointed
model (M, s) with epistemic action (M, s).
The domain of M ⊗ M is the product of the domains of M and M, but restricted
to state/action pairs (t, t) such that M, t |	 pre(t), i.e., such that the action can be
executed in that state. An agent cannot distinguish pair (t, t) from pair (t ′, t′) in the
next epistemic state if she cannot distinguish states t and t ′ in the initial epistemic state
and also cannot distinguish action t (that is executed in t) from t′ (that is executed in
t ′).
In the logical language we can associate a dynamic operator with the execution of an
epistemic action, similar to the dynamic operator for a truthful public announcement
in the state elimination setting: [M, s]ϕ means that after every execution of epistemic
action (M, s), ϕ is true. The model M occurring in modalities [M, s] needs to have
a finite domain (for the logical language to be well-defined). The semantics of this
modality is then as follows.
Definition 18 (Action model logic) Let L⊗ be the logical language with the inductive
construct [M, s]ϕ instead of [ϕ]ϕ. Then:
M, s |	 [M, s]ϕ iff M, s |	 pre(s) implies (M ⊗M), (s, s) |	 ϕ
Let S′ ⊆ S. By abbreviation we define [M, S′]ϕ as
∧
s∈S′ [M, s]ϕ for the multi-pointed
action model (M, S′), and [M]ϕ as
∧
s∈S[M, s]ϕ.
Definition 19 (Action model Aϕ) Given a formula ϕ ∈ L
⊗, the action model Aϕ =
(S, R, pre) is defined as:
• S = {(i, J ) | i ∈ {0, 1} and J ⊆ AGT} ∪ {s⊤};
• R maps each agent a ∈ AGT to
Ra = {((i, J ), (1, K )) | i ∈ {0, 1}, J, K ⊆ AGT and a ∈ J } ∪
{((i, J ), s⊤) | i ∈ {0, 1}, J ⊆ AGT and a /∈ J } ∪ {(s⊤, s⊤)};
• pre : S → L is defined as follows, given J ⊆ AGT:
– pre((0, J )) = ¬ϕ ∧
∧
a∈J ha ∧
∧
a /∈J ¬ha ;
– pre((1, J )) = ϕ ∧
∧
a∈J ha ∧
∧
a /∈J ¬ha ;
– pre(s⊤) = ⊤;
Definition 20 (From attention-based announcements to action models) We define a
recursive translation tr : L → L⊗. All clauses except the one for announcement are
trivial. In the clause for announcement, S− = S\{s⊤}.
tr(q) = q tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ) tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ϕ)
tr(Baϕ) = Ba(tr(ϕ)) tr([ψ]ϕ) = [Atr(ψ), S
−]tr(ϕ)
Definition 21 (Action model for attention-based announcement) The multi-pointed
action model (Atr(ϕ), S
−) is the action model for the attention-based announcement
of ϕ.
Given |AGT| = n agents, the action model for the attention-based announcement of
ϕ consists of 2n+1+1 actions and has 2n+1 designated points. (The set of designated
points is the second argument in a pair that constitutes a multi-pointed action model.)
The precondition for any of these points lists whether the announced ϕ is true or false
and which agents are attentive and which agents not. Moreover, there is a ‘nothing
happens’ action s⊤ with precondition ⊤. This action cannot be a designated point:
we assume that the announcement is in fact made. We recall that in our approach,
announcements can be made independently from the truth of the announced formula.
Therefore, ϕ may be true but it may also be false. However, as the announcement
is believed (to be true), an attentive agent believes that any action with precondition
entailing ϕ may be the actual action. (‘Any’ action: including those wherein the agent
is not paying attention. This seems inconsistent with the requirement of attention
introspection. But in fact it does not matter, as in that case the agent only considers
states possible in the epistemic attention model that satisfy awareness introspection,
a property that is preserved after announcement—Prop. 7.) But an inattentive agent
believes that the action with precondition ⊤ is the actual action: she believes that no
announcement was made.
This action model matches nicely with the semantics of [ϕ]ψ which, given a model
M , produces a model Mϕ twice the size of M , namely consisting of a unchanged copy
of M plus copy M ′ of M wherein the attentive agents restrict their accessibility to the
ϕ states. As all the 2n+1 different preconditions of actions (i, J ) in the action model
are exclusive, the product of that entire part of the action model produces a model of
the same size as M , but with merely some removed arrows, whereas the single action
s⊤ with precondition ⊤ produces the other, trivial copy.
Example 22 For the example of two agents a and b and the announcement p, the action
model for attention-based announcements is depicted in Fig. 4. When p is false, ha is
true, and hb is false, then agent a hears the announcement p and believes it to be true,
therefore she believes the real action to be the one where p is true—regardless of the
values of ha and hb in states wherein it can be executed. So that makes for four arrows.
On the other hand, agent b does not hear the announcement and believes that nothing
at all happens: therefore there is a single arrow to the alternative with precondition⊤,
and with reflexive arrows for a and b: b believes, incorrectly, that both agents believe
that nothing happened.
Proposition 23 Let M be an epistemic attention model, and ϕ ∈ L. Then Mϕ ↔ M⊗
Atrϕ .
Fig. 4 The action model Ap
corresponding to an
attention-based announcement p
to two agents a and b. The
model consists of nine actions,
represented by their
preconditions only. The six
arrows pointing to the dashed
box point to all four actions in
the box
¬p, ¬ha, ¬hb
¬p, ¬ha, hb
¬p, ha, ¬hb
¬p, ha, hb
p, ¬ha, ¬hb
p, ¬ha, hb
p, ha, ¬hb
p, ha, hb
⊤
a, b
a
b
a, b
a
b
a, b
a
b
a, b
a
b
a, b
Proof The bisimulation relation R consists of the following pairs, for all s in M ; and
where J = {a ∈ AGT | M, s |	 ha}:
((s, h), (s, (0, J )))
((s, h), (s, (1, J )))
((s, h), (s, s⊤))
⊓⊔
Proposition 24 Let ϕ in L, and let (M, s) be a pointed model. Then M, s |	 ϕ iff
M, s |	 tr(ϕ).
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. In the proof we essentially
use that bisimilarity implies logical equivalence (∗) in either semantics. The non-
trivial case of the inductive proof is [ψ]ϕ. Other cases are left to the reader. Below,
let J = {a ∈ AGT | M, s |	 ha}. Observe that any t ∈ S
− has shape (i, J ′), for
i = 0, 1 and J ′ ⊆ AGT. The only pairs (i, J ′) satisfying the precondition in state s
are (i, J ′) = (0, J ) and (i, J ′) = (1, J ). This is used in (∗∗).
M, s |	 [ψ]ϕ
⇔ Mψ , (s, h) |	 ϕ
⇔ M ⊗ Atr(ψ), (s, (i, J )) |	 ϕ, for i = 0, 1 (by Prop. 23, and (∗))
⇔ M ⊗ Atr(ψ), (s, (i, J )) |	 tr(ϕ), for i = 0, 1 (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ for all t ∈ S− : M, s |	 pre(t) implies M ⊗ Atr(ψ), (s, t) |	 tr(ϕ) (∗∗)
⇔ M, s |	 [Atr(ψ), S
−]tr(ϕ)
⇔ M, s |	 tr([ψ]ϕ)
⊓⊔
6 Attention Change
Example 25 Consider agents a and b that are both not paying attention, and that are
also both uncertain whether the other is paying attention, and that are uncertain about
p. (Cf. Example 1.)
A private way to make someone listen to you is to tap on her shoulder before you
speak. This only makes that person attentive and not the other agents. So, if I tap on
a’s shoulder and then say p, only a and not b will hear it. I can then tap on agent b’s
shoulder and say p again, then in the resulting situation a and b both know p, but b
does not know that: he still considers it possible that a was not paying attention. On
the other hand, a knows that b is paying attention, because she was already paying
attention when b was tapped on the shoulder. (Here, we assume that agents that are
paying attention hear what is being said, but also observe other public actions.) An
epistemic attention model with the same information content (i.e., bisimilar) would
have resulted if I had first tapped a and then b, and only then had said p (i.e., once
only).
If I first tap b’s shoulder and then a’s shoulder, then again both a and b will now hear
the subsequent announcement of p. In this case we have the dual situation where a
considers it possible that b is not paying attention when the announcement was made.
So the result is again that both know that p, but now a does not know that.
In contrast, if you clap your hands, this is a public way to get attention. After
clapping hands, everybody is paying attention, and everybody knows that everybody
is paying attention, etc. After clapping hands in the example, a and b are both attentive
but now also know that the other is attentive (and so on). When p is now announced,
again they both know that p afterwards, but they also know that they know that. In
fact, after clapping hands they have joint attention, such that after the announcement
of p they have common knowledge (correct common belief) of p. Joint attention and
common belief will be treated in the next sections.
Drawing inspiration from van Ditmarsch et al. (2005), van Benthem et al. (2006), we
model such attention change by an assignment. Given a set of agents A ⊆ AGT, we
distinguish the assignment +A that makes all agents a ∈ A pay attention and hear
subsequent announcements, from an assignment −A that makes all ha false. Such
an assignment +A, for A = {a1, . . . , an}, is merely a convenient shorthand for a
simultaneous assignment ha1 := ⊤, . . . , han := ⊤ that is private to the subset A of
agents.
Definition 26 (Attention assignment) To the inductive definition of the language L
(Def. 2) we add clauses [+A]ϕ and [−A]ϕ, for A ⊆ AGT. The resulting language is
called L+.
For [+{a}]ϕ we write [+a]ϕ, and for [−{a}]ϕ we write [−a]ϕ.
Definition 27 (Semantics of attention assignment) Let M = (S, R, V ) and ψ ∈ L be
given, and A ⊆ AGT. Then
M, s |	 [+A]ψ iff M+A, (s, h) |	 ψ
M, s |	 [−A]ψ iff M−A, (s, h) |	 ψ
where M+A = (S
′, R′, V ′) is defined as follows.
1. S′ = S × {h, h};
2. if a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S then ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a iff (s, t) ∈ Ra and
(a) i=h and j=h; or
(b) i=h and j=h;
3. if a /∈ A and s, t ∈ S then ((s, i), (t, j)) ∈ R′a iff (s, t) ∈ Ra and
(a) i=h, j=h, and (M, s) |	 ha ; or
(b) i=h, j=h, and (M, s)  ha ; or
(c) i=h and j=h;
4. for p ∈ ATM and s ∈ S: (s, h) ∈ V ′(p) iff s ∈ V (p), and (s, h) ∈ V ′(p) iff
s ∈ V (p);
5. if a ∈ A then
(a) (s, h) ∈ V ′(ha), and
(b) (s, h) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha).
6. if a /∈ A then
(a) (s, h) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha), and
(b) (s, h) ∈ V ′(ha) iff s ∈ V (ha);
The definition of M−A is similar. We call the resulting logics ABALch and ABAL
int
ch.
In the case of the singleton attention assignment +a, agent a will now pay attention
in the h-copy of the initial model and may or may not be paying attention in the h-
copy (that copies the prior information state). If another agent b was already paying
attention he will now know that a is now paying attention (clause 3a above, for agents
not paying attention, wherein arrows point to other h-worlds); else his knowledge of
a’s attention span is as before (clause 3b above). The only factual information change
takes place in the h-copy, and only for ha . This is the part (s, h) ∈ V
′(ha) in clause
5a, i.e., ha is now true for all states s in the h-copy.
Proposition 28 Attention assignment preserves attention introspection.
Proof Obvious. ⊓⊔
The order matters in successive attention change, and this is different again from
simultaneous attention change. Recalling the introductory Example 25 in this section,
we have that neither [+a][+b]ϕ ↔ [+b][+a]ϕ nor [+ab]ϕ ↔ [+b][+a]ϕ are valid.
Just as for attention-based announcements, an attention assignment corresponds
to an action model that is a function of who is paying attention and the assignment.
The logic to which attention assignment has been added can therefore also easily be
axiomatized. This inspired the reduction axioms for [+A] and [−A] assignments in
the axiomatization in Table 2.
Just as in the axiomatization for ABAL, we do not have interaction axioms between
different dynamic modalities, but instead we use the rule of substitution of equiva-
lents. Otherwise, in order to obtain completeness by rewriting, we would have needed
no less than 8 additional reduction axioms, namely for [+A][+A′]ϕ, [+A][−A′]ϕ,
[−A][+A′]ϕ, [−A][−A′]ϕ, [+A][ψ]ϕ, [−A][ψ]ϕ, [ψ][+A′]ϕ, [ψ][−A′]ϕ. And it
is not even clear if any of those are straightforwardly formulated with [+A], [−A],
and [ψ] modalities (see above for some invalid principles). This motivated us to prefer
the version of the axiomatization with substitution of equivalents.
Table 2 The axiomatizations ABALch and ABAL
int
ch
[+A]p ↔ p if p ∈ ATM
[−A]p ↔ p if p ∈ ATM
[+A]ha ↔
{
⊤ if a ∈ A
ha if a /∈ A
[−A]ha ↔
{
⊥ if a ∈ A
ha if a /∈ A
[+A]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[+A]ϕ
[−A]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[−A]ϕ
[+A](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [+A]ϕ ∧ [+A]ψ
[−A](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [−A]ϕ ∧ [−A]ψ
[+A]Baϕ ↔
{
Ba [+A]ϕ if a ∈ A
(ha → Ba [+A]ϕ) ∧ (¬ha → Baϕ) if a /∈ A
[−A]Baϕ ↔
{
Ba [−A]ϕ if a ∈ A
(ha → Ba [−A]ϕ) ∧ (¬ha → Baϕ) if a /∈ A
Definition 29 (Axiomatizations ABALch and ABAL
int
ch) The axiomatization for
ABALch consists of the rules and axioms of ABAL plus the axioms in Table 2. Sim-
ilarly, we get the axiomatization for ABALintch by adding these axioms to those for
ABALint.
Theorem 30 ABALch and ABAL
int
ch are sound and complete.
Proof Straightforward. ⊓⊔
6.1 Embedding private announcement and public announcement
We now apply the operators for attention-based announcement and change of atten-
tion to provide an embedding of Gerbrandy’s already mentioned logic of private
announcements (or conscious updates) Gerbrandy (1999) and of (believed) pub-
lic announcement logic into ABAL. Gerbrandy’s logic has constructs with dynamic
modalities ϕAψ , for A ⊆ AGT, expressing that ψ is the case after the members
of group A learn that ϕ, where the agents outside A believe that nothing happens.
The arrow eliminating public announcement ϕ is the special case of the ‘private’
announcement to all agents. The crucial reduction axiom is
ϕA Baψ ↔
{
Baψ if a /∈ A
Ba(ϕ→ ϕAψ) if a ∈ A
The semantics of ϕAψ is given in terms of non-wellfounded sets; this is somewhat
cumbersome, but fortunately we have an alternative action model modelling at our dis-
posal. The most suggestive way to model private announcements (namely suggesting
Fig. 5 Action model for a
private announcement of ϕ to
agents a ∈ A, while agents
b ∈ AGT\A think that nothing
happened. The actions are
labelled with their preconditions
¬ϕ ϕ
⊤
b
a
b
a, b
a
action models for attention-based announcements) is as the three-action action model
in Fig. 5 (see also van Ditmarsch et al. (2007, Sect. 6.9)).
Definition 31 (Embedding of private announcements) Let LG (G for Gerbrandy) be
the language L of ABAL with the construct [ϕ]ϕ replaced by ϕAϕ (for all A ⊆ AGT).
Define the embedding tr of LG(ATM, AGT) into L(ATM ∪ H, AGT) as follows :
tr(p) = p, tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ), tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ), tr(Baϕ) = Ba tr(ϕ), and
tr(ϕAψ) = [+A][−(AGT\A)][tr(ϕ)]tr(ψ).
Proposition 32 Let (M, s) be a pointed epistemic attention model (for ATM ∪H and
AGT), and ϕ ∈ LG(ATM). Then (M, s) |	 ϕ iff (M, s) |	 tr(ϕ).
Proof After the agents in A have been made attentive, the other agents are made
inattentive. Therefore, the attentive agents in A notice this. We now have the set-
ting of Gerbrandy, wherein the agents in A (correctly) assume that the other agents
do not receive the private information ϕ. Instead of a detailed proof involving non-
wellfounded set semantics, observe that Fig. 5 results if in Fig. 4 we only consider the
alternatives with preconditions ¬ϕ ∧ ha ∧ ¬hb and ϕ ∧ ha ∧ ¬hb (and ⊤). ⊓⊔
Corollary 33 Let ϕ,ψ ∈ L−, then ϕAψ is equivalent to [+A][−(AGT\A)][ϕ]ψ ,
and (the case of arrow eliminating public announcement) ϕψ is equivalent to
[+AGT][ϕ]ψ .
We emphasize that tr : LG(ATM, AGT) → L(ATM ∪ H, AGT) is more an embed-
ding than a translation, as the sets of atomic propositions in the respective logics are
different. More precisely, extending the input of tr to LG(ATM ∪ H, AGT) makes it
incorrect. For example, if one were to do so, consider two agents a, b and one variable
p. Then tr(ha ∧ pbha) = ha ∧ [+b][−a][p]ha . But the former is now no longer
equivalent to the latter: consider a model satisfying ha . After private announcement
of p to b, ha remains true. But after a is made inattentive, ha is false.
Still, in the setting of Proposition 32, (M, s) can be a model for atoms ATM ∪ H
and agents AGT, even with ϕ ∈ LG(ATM, AGT). All values for variables ha ∈ H in
any state of M are ‘don’t care’ values, as they are reset on the entire model by the +A
and −A assignments.
The embedding of private announcements into attention-based announcements
brings up some fundamental additional considerations. Gerbrandy’s private announce-
ments, together with obvious program operations like sequential execution, non-
deterministic choice, and test, are sufficient to describe action models. This was shown
in French et al. (2014). (Although this was not for the original Gerbrandy setting of non
well-founded sets. For other embeddings see van Ditmarsch (2000), van Ditmarsch
et al. (2003), that are also motivated by Gerbrandy’s prior work.) But that means that
Proposition 32 provides an indirect way to embed action model logic (without addi-
tional propositional variables for attention) into attention-based announcement logic.
As we also gave an action model equivalent of attention-based announcement (Def. 21
and Prop. 23), in other words an embedding of ABAL into action model logic, this
observation is of some interest. Now for expressivity this makes no difference: action
model logic and ABAL, with or without attention assignment, are equally expressive
(namely all are equally expressive as basic epistemic logic). But how do we, in view
of these embeddings, explain that attention-based announcement logic has a strictly
lower complexity than action model logic (Prop. 15)? Well, this demonstrates indi-
rectly that the first embedding must be more than polynomial! Clearly there are some
remaining open questions here.
7 Joint Attention
An interesting justification of attention-based announcement logic is that it allows us
to formalize a concept that has been widely discussed in the philosophical and in the
cognitive science literature, namely the concept of joint attention or joint attentional
state (Tommasello 1995, Lorini et al. 2005, Clark and Marshall 1981).
Let A ⊆ AGT. The idea is that the agents in A have joint attention (or are in a joint
attentional state) if and only if they are looking at the source of information together,
that is to say, every agent in A is looking at the source of information, every agent in A
believes that every agent in A is looking at the source of information, and so on. More
concisely, the agents in A are in a joint attentional state if and only if each of them
is looking at the source of information and focusing his attention on it and they have
common belief that each of them is looking at the source of information and focusing
his attention on it.
We will only introduce common belief in the next section, but we may as well
already informally assume a common belief operator CA for any subgroup A of the
set AGT of all agents, such that CAϕ stands for ‘the agents in group A commonly
believe ϕ’, and which is interpreted in the usual way by the transitive closure of the
union of all accessibility relations Ra for the agents in A.
Definition 34 (Joint attention) Given M = (S, R, V ), s ∈ S, and a set A ⊆ AGT
of agents, the pointed model (M, s) satisfies joint attention for A if s ∈ V (h A), and
the model M satisfies joint attention for A if V (h A) = S. The formula JointAttA is
defined as h A ∧ CAh A.
Clearly, if (M, s) satisfies joint attention then M need not satisfy joint attention; a
model satisfying joint attention for A makes JointAttA true; and if JointAttA is valid
on a model then it satisfies joint attention. We further have (as a generalization of
Prop. 7) that
Proposition 35 (Preservation of joint attention) If M satisfies joint attention for A ⊆
AGT, then Mϕ satisfies joint attention for A.
We also have that, modulo an otherwise trivial translation (compare to Corollary 33):
Proposition 36 Let M satisfy joint attention for AGT, and s in the domain of M. Then
M, s |	 [ϕ]ψ iff M, s |	 ϕψ .
Attention introspection for all agents a ∈ A, with corresponding axiom
∧
a∈A(ha →
Baha), is insufficient to obtain joint attention for A: it may be that h A is true while
some a ∈ A does not believe that h A.
As pointed out by Lorini et al. (2005), Clark and Marshall (1981), joint attention
explains the genesis of common beliefs in the context of social interaction. Such
genesis is often considered as related to public events in the sense that a common
belief is either a consequence of an event whose occurrence is so evident (viz. public)
that agents cannot but recognize it—as when, during a soccer match, players mutually
believe that they are playing soccer—or the product of a communication process—as
when the referee publicly announces that one player is expelled. From there on each
player believes that each other player believes and so on that one of them has been
expelled. Intuitively, an event is considered public if its occurrence is epistemically
accessible by everybody such that it becomes common belief between them. But what
are the intuitive conditions that make an event public? What are the reasons to believe
that an occurring event is commonly believed? In a normal situation (what is announced
is true, there is no noise in the communication channel, etc.) looking at the source of
information and having a common belief that everyone is looking at the source of
information (i.e., being in a joint attentional state) provide a sufficient condition for
the formation of a common belief. Let us (avoiding Moorean phenomena) restrict
ourselves to propositional variables. We then have that
|	 JointAttA → [p]CA p
but, as we already know, we also have
 [p]CA p
This now begs the question how we can obtain common knowledge for A other than
when all agents in A are attentive? This is indeed possible, even when some in A are
attentive and others in A are inattentive. The next section provides a full answer to
that question.
8 Common Belief
8.1 Attentive Relativized Common Belief
A well-known issue with the logic of public announcements is that the addition of com-
mon belief (common knowledge) makes the axiomatization more involved, because
the interaction between announcement and common belief cannot be described in an
axiom, but only in a derivation rule (Baltag et al. 1998). The elimination of announce-
ments by reduction no longer works (and indeed, the logic of public announcements
with common belief is more expressive than the logic of public announcements with-
out common belief). A conceptual and technical innovation addressing this issue is the
notion of relativized common belief: if one not merely considers what is true along all
accessibility paths labelled with the believing agents, but only considers such paths
that satisfy a relativization condition, then there is a reduction axiom again, and public
announcements can be eliminated from the logic of public announcement with rela-
tivized common belief (van Benthem et al. 2006). Of course, this is at the price of
higher expressivity of that announcement-free logic.
Following the previous section on joint attention, it is clear that a proper treat-
ment of common belief would make the attention-based announcement logic more
valuable to analyze phenomena in cognitive science, philosophy, and multi-agent sys-
tems. Semantically, this does not pose any problem. But the question then is how to
axiomatize such a logic. We were not successful with the two obvious ways out of
this predicament: finding an axiomatization with only the addition of common belief
(analogous to Baltag et al. (1998)), or finding an axiomatization with only the addition
of relativized common belief (analogous to van Benthem et al. (2006)). On first sight,
such roads seem well-tred, as their methods not merely apply to public announce-
ment logic but also to action model logic, and in Sect. 5 we modelled attention-based
announcement as an action model. So, it seemed that we merely needed to plug in
that action model, and either compute the derivation rule (for common belief after
attention-based announcement), or the reduction (for relativized common belief after
attention-based announcement), where the latter would be clearly preferable over the
former (as it is then typically easier to show completeness).
This method turned out to be not as straightforward as we thought, because the action
model for attention-based announcement is rather large (we recall that it is exponential
in the number of agents, see Sect. 5). The already not so intuitive derivation rule for
common belief after the action model modality of Baltag et al. (1998) would then
become really complex. However, the more obvious relativized common belief axiom
was also evasive, as the role of transformation matrices in the rewriting techniques of
van Benthem et al. (2006) proved a stumbling block as well for our ‘very large’ action
models. Something comes out, but for it to make sense, you need a computer.
Motivated by the relativized common belief by van Benthem et al. (2006), we
here provide an adaptation of that notion, called attentive relativized common belief,
that also takes into account whether agents are paying attention. With that adap-
tation, we regain, we think, some elegance. The interaction between attention-based
announcement and common belief is then a different case from the interaction between
attention-based announcement and attentive relativized common belief.
Definition 37 (Languages with common belief) The language LC of ABAL with com-
mon belief is obtained by adding to the logical language L (Def. 2) inductive constructs
CAϕ and C
ϕ
Aϕ, for any A ⊆ AGT. Without announcements we get the language L
−
C .
For CAϕ, read ‘the agents in A commonly believe ϕ’. For C
χ
Aϕ, read ‘relative to χ ,
the attentive agents in A commonly believe ϕ’. (We will see that CAϕ = C
⊤
Aϕ.)
Prior to defining the semantics, let R+ be the transitive closure of a relation R.
Further, given a model (S, R, V ), let R
χ
a = {(s, t) ∈ Ra | M, s |	 ha and M, t |	 χ}.
Now define R
χ
A =
⋃
a∈A R
χ
a .
For more notational flexibility in this section, instead of (x, y) ∈ R we also write
y ∈ x R or x Ry, and if Mϕ is a model resulting from attention-based announcement
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of ϕ, we assume it to have shape Mϕ = (ϕS, ϕR, ϕV ). This unorthodox notation
is an advantage in constructs like ϕ R
χ
a ; which stands for the ‘attentive’ relativized
accessibility relation that is based on the accessibility relation ϕRa in the model Mϕ .
Definition 38 (Semantics of common belief)
M, s |	 C
χ
Aϕ iff M, t |	 ϕ for all (s, t) ∈ (R
χ
A)
+
Given a group of agents A ⊆ AGT, common belief CAψ is the fixpoint of shared
belief E Aψ =
∧
a∈A Baψ and we recall from van Benthem et al. (2006) that, given a
formula χ , relativized common belief C
χ
Aϕ is the fixpoint of relativized shared belief
E A(χ → ψ) (i.e.,
∧
a∈A Ba(χ → ψ)). In the same way, we can define attentive
relativized shared belief by abbreviation as
E
χ
Aϕ =
∧
a∈A
(ha → Ba(χ → ϕ))
and then we can see attentive relativized common belief among the agents in A as the
fixpoint of E
χ
A:
C
χ
Aϕ = E
χ
Aϕ ∧ E
χ
A E
χ
Aϕ ∧ . . .
The semantics of attentive relativized shared belief therefore is: M, s |	 E
χ
Aϕ iff
M, t |	 ϕ for all (s, t) ∈ R
χ
A.
Example 39 (Attentive common belief) Figure 6 illustrates the semantics of attentive
relativized common belief. The formula C
p
abq (short for C
p
{a,b}q) is true in the root of
the model. We can verify this by observing that q is true in all grey nodes. Each arrow
Fig. 6 Visualization of attentive
relativized common belief
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in one of the grey paths satisfies that the agent who labels the link is attentive at the
start of the arrow and that the relativization condition p is true at the end of the arrow.
Let us now give an impression of the consequences of this semantics. Clearly we
do not have that [p]CAGT p is valid for any atomic proposition p, because agents not
paying attention will not have heard the announcement of p and may still be uncertain
about p. But we have that [p]C⊤AGT p is valid. For this, see Example 40. Example 41,
building on Example 8, demonstrates where [p]CAGT p can be false and [p]C
⊤
AGT p
true. This is possible because the semantics of C⊤AGT takes attention into account, while
that of CAGT does not.
Example 40 We show that |	 [p]C⊤AGT p. Let (M, s) be an epistemic attention model.
Note that M, s |	 [p]C⊤AGT p iff Mp, (s, h) |	 C
⊤
AGT p. We show the latter, i.e., for any
(t, i) ∈ (s, h)(p R
⊤
AGT)
+: Mp, (t, i) |	 p. This follows from the stronger claim that
for all n ∈ N:
For all (t, i) ∈ (s, h)(p R
⊤
AGT)
n : Mp, (t, i) |	 p and i = h.
Proof by induction on n: Let (t, i) ∈ (s, h)p R
⊤
a , for some a ∈ AGT. This implies
M, s |	 ha and M, t |	 p. As M, s |	 ha , i must be h; while M, t |	 p, together with
M, t |	 p iff Mp, (t, h) |	 p, delivers Mp, (t, h) |	 p and thus completes the proof.
The inductive case is similar.
Example 41 We build on Example 8 (page 6), illustrated in Fig. 1. Consider the state
in model M in Fig. 1 that is labeled {p, ha, hb}. We denote this state as s. We note
that AGT = {a, b}. In Mp, resulting from the attention-based announcement that p,
we have the path
{p, ha, hb} −→b {p,¬ha, hb} −→a {¬p,¬ha, hb}
where the former two are in the h part of Mp and the latter is in the h part. From this,
it follows that Mp, (s, h)  CAGT p and thus M, s  [p]CAGT p.
Example 42 (Creation of Common Knowledge) Even if agents have incorrect beliefs
and some of them are inattentive, correct common belief (common knowledge) can
be created after an announcement, i.e., two wrongs can make a right.
Agents a and b meet in a Paris college. Say agent a is a French student, and agent b is
an American student who is in France for an exchange programme. After introducing
themselves to each other before class, a tells b that today he will not be paying attention
during class, since the topic of the lecture is the theory of evolution which, according
to a, is already known by any student worldwide. This is not the case though, as b is
uncertain between evolution and other theories on the origin of humankind; so b will
be attentive. But to sound cool, b tells a that she will not be attentive either. So far, this
background information allows us to justify the model M in Fig. 7; we do not model
the conversation leading up to it.
In class, the teacher presents the evidence for the evolution theory and the American
student b becomes convinced. This is, in other words, the announcement of p. After
the announcement, p is common knowledge among the two students. This is depicted
p, ¬ha, hb
¬p, ¬ha, hbp, ¬ha, ¬hb
a
a
b
b
ba, b
M
⇓ announcement of p
p, ¬ha, hb
¬p, ¬ha, hbp, ¬ha, ¬hb
p, ¬ha, hb
¬p, ¬ha, hbp, ¬ha, ¬hb
b
b
ba
b
ba, b
a
a
a, b
Mp
Fig. 7 Depiction of the transition in Example 42
in model Mp. Even though the the accessibility relation for a is not reflexive, we
can still call this common belief of p common knowledge as p is true in the actual
(underlined) state.
8.2 Axiomatizations with Common Belief
The axioms and rules for the logic ABALC, i.e., attention-based announcement logic
with common belief and attentive relativized common belief, are those of ABAL
together with the axioms of Table 3. The axiomatization for the logic KC, that is,
multi-agent modal logic with attentive relativized common belief, consists of the part
of ABALC that does not contain announcement modalities. In the axiomatization,
we have also used the abbreviation: E Aψ =
∧
a∈A(¬ha → Baψ), which stands
for shared knowledge among the non-attentive agents in A of ψ . (With an obvious
associated accessibility relation RA such that M, s |	 E Aψ iff M, t |	 ψ for all
(s, t) ∈ RA.) Among the axioms, we have the usual Mix and Induction axioms char-
acterizing the fixpoint modalities C
χ
A and CA. Prior to demonstrating the soundness of
the axiomatization, let us explain informally the two axioms for common belief after
announcement, starting with the one for attentive relativized common belief.
[ϕ]C
χ
Aψ ↔ C
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A [ϕ]ψ
The relativized common belief operator only goes through paths where agents are
attentive: we call these paths attentive paths. (More precisely, a path s1, . . . , sn is
attentive iff M, si |	 ha for all links (si , si+1) ∈ Ra in the path.) After announcing ϕ,
the relativized common belief operator goes through all attentive paths satisfying χ
in the updated models. These paths are exactly the attentive paths satisfying ϕ ∧ [ϕ]χ
in the initial model.
Table 3 Axioms and rules involving common belief for the axiomatizations for ABALC and (without the
*-ed axioms) for KC
C
χ
A
ψ ↔ E
χ
A
(ψ ∧ C
χ
A
ψ) Mix C
C
χ
A
ψ ← E
χ
A
ψ ∧ C
χ
A
(ψ → E
χ
A
ψ) Induction C
C
χ
A
ψ ← C
χ
A
ϕ ∧ C
χ
A
(ϕ→ ψ) Distribution C
[ϕ]C
χ
A
ψ ↔ C
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A
[ϕ]ψ Reduction C *
CAψ ↔ E A(ψ → CAψ) Mix C
CAψ ← E Aψ ∧ CA(ψ → E Aψ) Induction C
CAψ ← CAϕ ∧ CA(ϕ→ ψ) Distribution C
[ϕ]CAψ ↔ C
ϕ
A
([ϕ]ψ ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)) ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ) Reduction C*
From ϕ infer C
χ
A
ϕ Necessitation C
From ϕ infer CAϕ Necessitation C
Now consider the axiom for common belief after an announcement.
[ϕ]CAψ ↔ C
ϕ
A([ϕ]ψ ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)) ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)
This describes that in order for A to obtain common belief of ψ after announcement
of ϕ, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, inattentive agents in A should already
believeψ to be true and to be commonly believed before the announcement. Secondly,
the attentive agents in A must have common belief of that, and also commonly believe
that after the announcement of ϕ, ψ is true.
So, after all, recalling Sect. 7, growth of common belief is possible in this logic, even
when not all agents are attentive. We consider this an important result (see Example
42).
Lemma 43 |	 [ϕ]C
χ
Aψ ↔ C
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A [ϕ]ψ .
Proof Let (M, s) be given. We first show that:
(s, h)(ϕ R
χ
A)
+(t, h) iff s(R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A )
+t (∗)
For this, it suffices to show that: (s, h)ϕ R
χ
A(t, h) iff s R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A t ; and that follows from:
for all a ∈ A: (s, h)ϕ R
χ
a (t, h) iff s R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
a t , shown below. The proof for the transi-
tively closed relations then follows immediately.
(s, h)(ϕ R
χ
a )(t, h)
iff Mϕ, (s, h) |	 ha, (s, h)R
ϕ
a (t, h), and Mϕ, (t, h) |	 χ
iff M, s |	 ha, s Ra t, M, t |	 [ϕ]χ , and M, t |	 ϕ
iff s R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
a t
We now proceed as follows:
M, s |	 [ϕ]C
χ
Aψ
iff Mϕ, (s, h) |	 C
χ
Aψ
iff for all (t, h) ∈ (s, h)(ϕ R
χ
A)
+ : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ (by (*))
iff for all t ∈ s(R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A )
+ : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ (by the truth condition of [ϕ]ψ)
iff for all t ∈ s(R
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A )
+ : M, t |	 [ϕ]ψ
iff M, s |	 C
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A [ϕ]ψ
⊓⊔
Proposition 44 |	 [ϕ]CAψ ↔ C
ϕ
A([ϕ]ψ ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)) ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)
Proof In the proof, the symbol ‘·’ stands for relational composition.
M, s |	 [ϕ]CAψ
iff Mϕ, (s, h) |	 CAψ
iff for all (t, i) ∈ (s, h)(ϕRA)
+ : Mϕ, (t, i) |	 ψ
iff for all (t, h) ∈ (s, h)(ϕ R
⊤
A)
+ : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ and
for all (t, h) ∈ (s, h)((ϕ R
⊤
A)
∗ · ϕ RA · (ϕRA)
∗) : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ
iff for all t ∈ s(R
ϕ
A)
+ : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ and
for all t ∈ s((R
ϕ
A)
∗ · RA · (RA)
∗) : Mϕ, (t, h) |	 ψ (by (*) in Lemma 43)
iff for all t ∈ s(R
ϕ
A)
+ : M, t |	 [ϕ]ψ and
for all t ∈ s((R
ϕ
A)
∗ · RA · (RA)
∗) : M, t |	 ψ
iff M, s |	 C
ϕ
A[ϕ]ψ and M, s |	 E A(ψ ∧ CAψ) ∧ C
ϕ
A E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)
iff M, s |	 C
ϕ
A([ϕ]ψ ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)) ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ)
⊓⊔
Proposition 45 (Soundness) The axiomatizations for ABALC and KC are sound.
Proof The only non-trivial cases are the axioms ‘Reduction C’ (Lemma 43) and
‘Reduction C ’ (Lemma 44). ⊓⊔
8.3 Completeness
The proof of completeness follows that of van Benthem et al. (2006). We first prove
the completeness of the logic KC (i.e. without announcements). The completeness
of the logic ABALC then simply follows from a translation of its language LC into
the language L−C of KC. The translation uses the reduction axioms for all possible
inductive cases after an announcement.
Definition 46 (Closure) The closure of ϕ is the minimal set 	 such that
1. ϕ ∈ 	,
2. 	 is closed under taking subformulas,
3. If ψ ∈ 	 and ψ is not a negation, then ¬ψ ∈ 	,
4. If CAψ ∈ 	, then E A(ψ ∧ CAψ) ∈ 	,
5. If C
χ
Aψ ∈ 	, then E
χ
A(ψ ∧ C
χ
Aψ) ∈ 	.
The closure of ϕ is a finite set. As a consequence the canonical model (defined next)
is also finite.
Definition 47 (Canonical model) Let	 be the closure of ϕ. The canonical model Mc
for ϕ is the triple (Sc, Rc, V c) where
Sc = {Ŵ ⊆ 	 | Ŵ is maximally consistent in 	}
Rca = {(Ŵ,
) | ψ ∈ 
 for all ψ with Baψ ∈ Ŵ}
V c(p) = {Ŵ | p ∈ Ŵ}
Lemma 48 (Truth Lemma) Let Mc be the canonical model for ϕ ∈ L, and letŴ ∈ Sc.
For all ψ ∈ 	: ψ ∈ Ŵ iff Mc,Ŵ |	 ψ .
Proof The proof of the Truth Lemma is found in the Appendix. ⊓⊔
Proposition 49 (Completeness of KC) |	 ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
Proof Let  ϕ. Then ¬ϕ is consistent. A maximal consistent set Ŵ, a subset of the
closure of ¬ϕ, exists with ¬ϕ ∈ Ŵ. By the Truth lemma (Lemma 48), Mc,Ŵ |	 ¬ϕ,
so we conclude  ϕ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 50 (Soundness and Completeness of KC) |	 ϕ iff ⊢ ϕ.
Proof From Proposition 45 (Soundness) and Proposition 49 (Completeness). ⊓⊔
We proceed by demonstrating completeness of ABALC, by employing a translation.
Definition 51 (Translation) The translation function tr : LC → L
−
C is defined as
follows:
tr(p) = p tr([ϕ]p) = p
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ) tr([ϕ]¬ψ) = tr(¬[ϕ]ψ)
tr(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ϕ′) tr([ϕ](ψ ∧ ψ ′)) = tr([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]ψ ′)
tr(Baϕ) = Ba tr(ϕ) tr([ϕ]Baψ) = tr((ha → Ba(ϕ→ [ϕ]ψ))∧
(¬ha → Baψ))
tr(CAϕ) = CAtr(ϕ) tr([ϕ]CAψ) = tr(C
ϕ
A([ϕ]ψ ∧ E A(ψ ∧ CAψ))∧
E A(ψ ∧ CAψ))
tr(C
χ
Aϕ) = C
tr(χ)
A tr(ϕ) tr([ϕ]C
χ
Aψ) = tr(C
ϕ∧[ϕ]χ
A [ϕ]ψ)
tr([ϕ][ϕ′]ψ) = tr([ϕ]tr([ϕ′]ψ))
Theorem 52 (Soudness and Completeness of ABALC) |	 ϕ iff ⊢ ϕ.
Proof The soundness follows, again, from Proposition 45. The completeness of the
proof system for the logic ABALC without announcement in the language follows from
the observation that every formula containing announcements is provably equivalent
to its translation obtained by applying the reduction axioms (Def. 51). ⊓⊔
9 Related Work and Conclusions
Our proposal is related to several other logics in dynamic epistemic logic, such as
to arrow update logic (Kooi and Renne 2011), wherein a simple dynamic operator
can have a large action model equivalent; and to action language approaches (Aucher
2009). There are further relations to logics with dedicated dynamics, such as the
framework reasoning about speech in Guiraud et al. (2009), reasoning about perception
as investigated in van Eijck (2012), reasoning about perceptual beliefs (Herzig and
Lorini 2013), and reasoning about visually oriented agents (Balbiani et al. 2012).
Paying attention to announcements would normally appear to mean that the agents
are listening to these announcements, but of course it equally applies to other public
events than public announcements and to other senses than hearing. If the event is a
light flash, then paying attention means having your eyes open (or facing the light).
If the event is inhaling the weak but ever present smell of flowering orange trees in
Seville, then paying attention means inhaling. (Joint attention seems difficult to obtain
for smell.) And so on.
Relations to other logics of announcement have been discussed in detail in previous
sections (Plaza 1989; Gerbrandy 1999), as has the relation to relativized common
knowledge (belief) (van Benthem et al. 2006). However, in those cases the relation
was more motivational; these were the sources of our ideas.
This work can be seen as part of a larger research program which consists of
developing computationally interesting dynamic epistemic logics wherein one can
reason about properties of perception and communication. Directions of future work
are manifold. On a similar setting we intend to model trust-based announcement logic.
We also intend to model announcements to agents that pay attention to other agents
making announcements (as in Bolander (2014)), instead of to the outsider who is
making the announcement and who is not modelled as an agent. One could distinguish
the case of agents paying attention to epistemic actions, such as announcements, from
agents paying attention to ontic actions, such as attention change.
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Appendix: Proof of Truth Lemma 48
Truth Lemma 48 Let Mc be the canonical model for ϕ ∈ L, and let Ŵ ∈ Sc. For all
ψ ∈ 	: ψ ∈ Ŵ iff Mc,Ŵ |	 ψ . ⊣
The proof is by induction on the structure of formulasψ ∈ 	, namely, on the property
P(ψ0) : for all 
 ∈ S
c : Mc,
 |	 ψ iff ψ ∈ 
.
Throughout this proof, we write Ra instead of R
c
a for the accessibility relation in the
canonical model. The cases for atomic propositions, negations, conjunction and belief
are as in van Benthem et al. (2006). We only prove the case for attentive relativized
common belief, and the similar case for common belief. We further define for an
arbitrary (finite) set of formulas Ŵ (such as a maximally consistent set in the domain
of Mc), δŴ =
∧
γ∈Ŵ γ , and for any collection  of such finite sets we define δ =∨
Ŵ∈ δŴ . The notation ⊢ ϕ stands for derivability of ϕ in the axiomatization.
(Case C
χ
Aψ) Suppose P(ψ), P(χ), and P(ha) for all a ∈ A. We prove that P(C
χ
Aψ).
⇒
Suppose C
χ
Aψ ∈ Ŵ, and let us prove that (M
c,Ŵ) |	 C
χ
Aψ . Let
 ∈ S
c be arbitrary
with (Ŵ,
) ∈ (R
χ
A)
+, where R
χ
A is the interpretation of the operator E
χ
A. (Note that
if no such 
 exists, we are done.) We must show that (Mc,
) |	 ψ . This is done by
induction on the length of the paths from Ŵ to 
. The claim is shown together with
C
χ
Aψ ∈ 
. So let:
Q(n) : for all 
 ∈ Sc, (Ŵ,
) ∈ (R
χ
A)
n : Mc,
 |	 ψ and C
χ
Aψ ∈ 
.
(Base Case) From the assumption (Ŵ,
) ∈ R
χ
A, we have (Ŵ,
) ∈ R
χ
a for some
a ∈ A. From this we get that Mc,Ŵ |	 ha and that M
c,
 |	 χ , so
(1) ha ∈ Ŵ and χ ∈ 
 by P(ha) and P(χ)
Also, C
χ
Aψ ∈ Ŵ implies by way of the (Mix C ) axiom that for any a ∈ A:
(2) ⊢ δŴ → (ha → Ba(χ → (ψ ∧ C
χ
Aψ)))
From (1), it follows that ⊢ δŴ → ha , which combined with (2) gives
(3) ⊢ δŴ → Ba(χ → (ψ ∧ C
χ
Aψ))
The latter implies that Ba(χ → (ψ ∧ C
χ
Aψ)) ∈ Ŵ, by the maximal consistency of Ŵ.
Hence, χ → (ψ ∧ C
χ
Aψ) ∈ 
 by the assumption (Ŵ,
) ∈ R
χ
a . Combining this with
χ ∈ 
 (1), we conclude that
(4) ψ ∈ 
 and C
χ
Aψ ∈ 

by the maximal consistency of 
. Finally, by P(ψ), we conclude that
(5) Mc,
 |	 ψ and C
χ
Aψ ∈ 

So, Q(1) is proved.
(Ind. Case) Assume Q(n) and let us prove Q(n + 1). For an arbitrary (n+1)-length
path from Ŵ to 
, let  be the n-th element in this path, i.e. (Ŵ,) ∈ (R
χ
A)
n and
(,
) ∈ R
χ
A. Then there is an a ∈ A such that ha ∈  and χ ∈ 
. Also, by Q(n),
we have C
χ
Aψ ∈ . Applying the same reasoning as in the Base Case, we conclude
that Mc,
 |	 ψ and C
χ
Aψ ∈ 
. So, Q(n + 1) is proved.
⇐
Suppose that Mc,Ŵ |	 C
χ
Aψ . We show that C
χ
Aψ ∈ Ŵ. Let S = {
 | (Ŵ,
)
∈ (R
χ
A)
+}. The set S is the set of successors reachable from Ŵ by the relation corre-
sponding to attentive relativized common belief. The formula δS (we recall that it is
defined as
∨

∈S δ
) is a syntactic description of the set of worlds S — recall that S
is finite, so δS is a formula.
We now prove the following three claims:
1. ⊢ δS → E
χ
AδS Claim 1
2. ⊢ δŴ → E
χ
AδS Claim 2
3. ⊢ δS → ψ Claim 3
Claim 1 says that we remain in S by taking an R
χ
a -transition. Claim 2 says that by
taking one R
χ
a -transition from Ŵ, we end up in S. Claim 3 says that ψ holds in all
(R
χ
A)
+-successors.
Proof of Claim 1 First, we prove that (
,
′) /∈ Ra implies⊢ δ
 → Ba¬δ
′ . Indeed,
(
,
′) /∈ Ra iff there is a formula ϕ such that Baϕ ∈ 
 and ϕ /∈ 

′. Thus, ⊢ δ
 →
Baϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ¬δ
′ . This implies that ⊢ δ
 → Ba¬δ
′ .
Let now a ∈ A, 
 ∈ S, and 
′ /∈ S. By the definition of S we have that (
,
′) /∈
R
χ
a . We then proceed as follows:
(
,
′) /∈ R
χ
a
iff Mc,
  ha, or (
,

′) /∈ Ra, or M
c,
′  χ
iff ha /∈ 
, or (
,

′) /∈ Ra or χ /∈ 

′ by P(ha),P(χ)
implies ⊢ δ
 → ¬ha, or ⊢ δ
 → Ba¬δ
′ or ⊢ χ → ¬δ
′ see above
implies ⊢ δ
 → ¬ha, or ⊢ δ
 → Ba¬δ
′ , or ⊢ Ba(χ → ¬δ
′)
implies ⊢ δ
 → ¬ha, or ⊢ δ
 → Ba(χ → ¬δ
′)
implies ⊢ δ
 → (ha → Ba(χ → ¬δ
′))
As all the quantifiers range over finite sets, we also have (wherein ‘big’ disjunctions
and ‘big’ conjunctions bind stronger than all other operators):
⊢
∧

∈S
∧

′∈S
∧
a∈A
(δ
 → (ha → Ba(χ → ¬δ
′)))
⊢
∨

∈S
δ
 →
∧
a∈A
(
ha → Ba
(
χ →
∧

′ /∈S
¬δ
′
))
We now use that ⊢
∨

∈Sc δ
; as S
c is the domain of all maximal consistent sets
in 	, then if this disjunction were not a theorem, its negation would be consistent,
from which we can easily obtain a contradiction. We then write this disjunction as ⊢∨

′ /∈S δ
′ ∨
∨

∈S δ
, in other words, as ⊢
∧

′ /∈S ¬δ
′ →
∨

∈S δ
. We therefore
can conclude:
⊢
∨

∈S
δ
 →
∧
a∈A
(
ha → Ba
(
χ →
∨

∈S
δ

))
in other words,
⊢ δS → E
χ
AδS
Hence the claim is proven. ⊓⊔
Proof of Claim 2 It is omitted. It is similar to the proof of Claim 1, except that we
replace the arbitrary 
 ∈ S by the fixed set Ŵ. ⊓⊔
Proof of Claim 3 As Mc,Ŵ |	 C
χ
Aψ , we have, for all 
 ∈ S, that M
c,
 |	 ψ . By
P(ψ), we have ψ ∈ 
.
Therefore ⊢ δ
 → ψ for all 
 ∈ S. So ⊢ δS → ψ .
This completes the proof of all three claims. ⊓⊔
Having thus proved these claims, we now proceed as follows.
(i) ⊢ C
χ
A
(
δS → E
χ
AδS
)
by applying (Necessitation C ) on Claim 1
(i i) ⊢ E
χ
AδS ∧ C
χ
A(δS → E
χ
AδS) → C
χ
AδS instance of (Induction C )
(i i i) ⊢ E
χ
AδS → C
χ
AδS by propositional reasoning on (i) and (i i)
(iv) ⊢ δŴ → C
χ
AδS by Claim 2 and (i i i)
(v) ⊢ C
χ
AδS → C
χ
Aψ by (Necessitation C ) and (Distribution C ) on Claim 3
(vi) ⊢ δŴ → C
χ
Aψ by propositional reasoning on (iv) and (v)
From (vi), the maximal consistency of Ŵ in 	, and C
χ
Aψ ∈ 	 by assumption, we
conclude that C
χ
Aψ ∈ Ŵ.
This closes the Case C
χ
Aψ of the Truth Lemma. We continue with the Case CAψ .
(Case CAψ) Suppose that P(ψ), and let us prove P(CAψ). For this case, the proof is
simpler than that of C
χ
Aψ : we replace the relation R
χ
A by RA (i.e., R
c
A) everywhere,
e.g., in the reformulation of Q(n) that now becomes:
Q′(n) : for all 
 ∈ Sc, (Ŵ,
) ∈ RnA : M
c,
 |	 ψ and CAψ ∈ 
.
⇒
From Mc,Ŵ |	 CAψ we directly obtain, by the (Mix C) axiom:
(3′) ⊢ δŴ → Ba(ψ ∧ CAψ)
so that, as before, for any (Ŵ,
) ∈ Ra,ψ∧CAψ ∈ 
, thus, using P(ψ), M
c,
 |	 ψ
and CAψ ∈ 
: Q
′(1) is true. The inductive case for Q′(n) ⇒ Q′(n + 1) is again
straightforward.
⇐
For this part of the proof, we redefine the set S as S = {
 | (Ŵ,
) ∈ (RcA)
+}, and
replace Claim 1 and Claim 2 by, respectively, ⊢ δS → E AδS and ⊢ δŴ → E AδS ,
whereas Claim 3 is as before. The proofs of these claims are then analogous to the
previous cases, wherein one should replace C
χ
A by CA and abstract from (remove
occurrences of) χ and the atomic propositions ha . For the remainder of this part of the
proof, the steps (i)-(vi) are also similar, but now we use (Necessitation C), (Induction
C) and (Distribution C).
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